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Among the locutions one finds rendered as essence in contemporary translations of Aristotle into English are: (i) to ti esti (the what it is); (ii) to einai (being); (iii) ousia (being); (iv) hoper esti (precisely what something is) and, most importantly, (v) to ti ên einai (the what it was to be) (APo 83a7; Top. He relies upon a host of loosely related locutions when discussing the essences of things, and these give some clue to his general orientation. Aristotle believes for a broad range of cases that kinds have essences discoverable by diligent research. Scholars have understandably queried what seems a casually asserted passage from the contingent, given in sense experience, to the necessary, as required for the first principles of science. Given that whatever is not due to chance has a final cause, teeth have a final cause. As he recognizes, we often find ourselves reasoning from premises which have the status of endoxa, opinions widely believed or endorsed by the wise, even though they are not known to be necessary. Consequently, in addition to being explanatorily basic, the first premise in a scientific deduction will be necessary.

If we are to lay out demonstrations such that the less well known is inferred by means of deduction from the better known, then unless we reach rock-bottom, we will evidently be forced either to continue ever backwards towards the increasingly better known, which seems implausibly endless, or lapse into some form of circularity, which seems undesirable. Aristotle assumes his readers will appreciate that being rational asymmetrically explains being capable of grammar, even though, necessarily, something is rational if and only if it is also capable of grammar. However we arrive at secure principles in philosophy and science, whether by some process leading to a rational grasping of necessary truths, or by sustained dialectical investigation operating over judiciously selected endoxa, it does turn out, according to Aristotle, that we can uncover and come to know genuinely necessary features of reality. Thus, because it is explanatorily prior, being rational has a better claim to being the essence of human beings than does being capable of grammar. Altogether, then, the currency of science is demonstration (apodeixis), where a demonstration is a deduction with premises revealing the causal structures of the world, set forth so as to capture what is necessary and to reveal what is better known and more intelligible by nature (APo 71b33-72a5, Phys.

This is the knowledge featured in genuine science (epistêmê). In sum, if all knowledge requires demonstration, and all demonstration proceeds from what is more intelligible by nature to what is less so, then either the process goes on indefinitely or it comes to a halt in undemonstrated first principles, which are known, and known securely. The method of imposition or the order of arrangement differs according to the number of pages in the form, but the general principle of the process may be understood from the following diagram of a 16-page form, in which the numeral in each case indicates the number of the page in that form and its location the top of the page. In Posterior Analytics ii 19, he describes the process by which knowers move from perception to memory, and from memory to experience (empeiria)-which is a fairly technical term in this connection, reflecting the point at which a single universal comes to take root in the mind-and finally from experience to a grasp of first principles.

For instance, "Spanish Point" and "Point d'Espagne" have been misapplied to Italian laces, in the same way that "Point d'Angleterre" has been misapplied to Brussels lace. In reflecting on the sort of progression Aristotle envisages, some commentators have charged him with an epistemological optimism bordering on the naïve; others contend that it is rather the charge of naïveté which is itself naïve, betraying as it does an unargued and untenable alignment of the necessary and the a priori. In these contexts, dialectic helps to sort the endoxa, relegating some to a disputed status while elevating others; it submits endoxa to cross-examination in order to test their staying power; and, most notably, according to Aristotle, dialectic puts us on the road to first principles (Top. If that is so, then dialectic plays a significant role in the order of philosophical discovery: we come to establish first principles in part by determining which among our initial endoxa withstand sustained scrutiny. Still less often do we reason having first secured the first principles of our domain of inquiry. This final intellectual state Aristotle characterizes as a kind of unmediated intellectual apprehension (nous) of first principles (APo. Aristotle’s own preferred alternative, that there are first principles of the sciences graspable by those willing to engage in assiduous study, has caused consternation in many of his readers.

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